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Abstract 
There is a vast literature within philosophy of mind that focuses on artificial intelligence, 
but hardly mentions methodological questions. There is also a growing body of work in 
philosophy of science about modeling methodology that hardly mentions examples from 
cognitive science. Here these discussions are connected. Insights developed in the 
philosophy of science literature about the importance of idealization provide a way of 
understanding the neural implausibility of connectionist networks. Insights from 
neurocognitive science illuminate how relevant similarities between models and targets 





For about 20 years, philosophy of artificial intelligence (AI) has been confined to 
a rather dusty corner of philosophy of mind.1 Despite the very widespread use of methods 
like support vector machines, decision trees, principal components analysis, and neural 
networks in many branches of science and engineering, contemporary AI has largely 
escaped the notice of philosophers of science.2 During the same time period, models and 
simulations have grown from a niche subject to a popular sub-discipline within 
philosophy of science, although these discussions tend to focus on the use of models in a 
handful of fields (economics, climate science, physics, ecology) that does not include the 
neurocognitive sciences.  
It is past time for these estranged relatives to be reunited. With the infiltration of 
machine learning into so many of the technologies that mediate our lives, understanding 
AI methods could hardly be more topical. Likewise, understanding how and when to trust 
                                                           
1 For signs of renewed activity, see Buckner (2019). 
2 Godfrey-Smith (2006, 2009) mentions neural networks very briefly. 
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the predictions of climate models is urgently important. This paper paves the way for the 
re-embrace of philosophy of AI into philosophy of science, and illustrates some potential 
benefits on both sides. 
A natural first step in bringing AI back into philosophy of science is to revisit a 
problem that holds a central place in discussions of methodology in AI: why is neural 
plausibility considered helpful in connectionist models, when the models are known not 
to be realistic? This problem was never resolved, but continues to be relevant, most 
recently in discussions of deep learning, where “adversarial examples” are revealing 
differences between computer and human vision (see Han et al. 2019). During 
connectionism’s heyday, the philosophical vocabulary to answer this question was 
lacking. Here we consider the problem of why and how cognitive models should be 
neurally plausible through the lens of a more general issue in scientific modeling: in what 
ways do models need to resemble their target systems in order to produce relevant, 
generalizable results? This proves useful in understanding connectionist models.  
Insights from the neurocognitive sciences likewise reveal important gaps in 
accounts of modeling and simulation, which rely on examples from a restricted set of 
scientific fields. Neurocognitive science brings a more critical view of representation, and 
digs deeper into questions about causation and the metaphysics of models. An analysis of 
inference in connectionist modeling based on kinds can be extended to models more 
generally. 
Section 2 exhumes the problem of connectionism’s simultaneous endorsement of 
and failure to follow through on neural plausibility. Section 3 surveys recent 
philosophical work on models and simulations to show how connectionism’s 
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methodological puzzle can be resolved by understanding connectionist models as 
idealized models of cognitive mechanisms. Section 4 explores gaps in standard 
philosophical accounts of scientific modeling from the perspective of the neurocognitive 
sciences, and outlines a novel account of the relationship between models and targets 
inspired by an analysis of connectionist models. Section 5 illustrates how this account 
applies to a series of examples of connectionist models. 
2. The Neural Implausibility of Connectionist Models 
Although it has a longer history, philosophical interest in connectionist modeling 
stems largely from the Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP) Research Group, whose 
two-volume ‘bible’ (Rumelhart and McClelland 1986a; McClelland and Rumelhart 1986) 
sparked debate about computational methods in cognitive science.3 The standard 
connectionist network architecture is a three-layer, feedforward network of simple 
neuron-like units, where each unit sends output to every unit in the next higher layer. Any 
pattern of connections is possible though, including sparse, lateral, feedback, or recurrent 
connections. Contemporary deep learning networks include more than 3 layers, and are 
often connected in small neighborhoods. The activity of the network is defined by each 
unit’s activation, each connection’s weight, and the activation function used to calculate a 
unit’s output based on the weighted sum of its input activations. The weights are adjusted 
using a learning rule designed to minimize overall error.  
At first glance, the connectionist project seems to be about building neurally 
plausible AI models. The introduction to the PDP bible states, “One reason for the appeal 
                                                           
3 A renewed interest in some of these questions is currently being hashed out in response 
to Marcus (2018). 
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of PDP models is their obvious ‘physiological’ flavor: They seem so much more closely 
tied to the physiology of the brain than are other kinds of information-processing model” 
(McClelland and Rumelhart 1986, 10). But on closer inspection, both the statement, and 
the motivations for the project, prove harder to interpret. What is meant by “flavor”? 
Why is “physiological” in scare quotes? In virtue of what is having a “physiological” 
flavor appealing?  
The PDP group’s stated inspiration was that classical AI’s models seemed 
unsuited for some kinds of computations: 
the biological hardware is just too sluggish for sequential models of the 
microstructure to provide a plausible account… Each additional constraint 
requires more time in a sequential machine, and, if the constraints are imprecise, 
the constraints can lead to a computational explosion. Yet people get faster, not 
slower, when they are able to exploit additional constraints. (McClelland and 
Rumelhart 1986, 12) 
It is also worth noting that the PDP group’s project was very much continuous with 
classical AI in their concern for building models that produce output that matches the 
results of psychological experiments, and their attention to reaction times: moves taken 
straight out of the cognitive psychologist’s toolbox.4 But because it was taken as a turn 
away from traditional approaches to cognitive science, the PDP bible’s appeal to 
biological hardware invited objections from the AI and cognitive psychology 
mainstream. These objections are organized below into four problems. 
2.1 The Levels Problem 
                                                           
4 Hinton, Rumelhart, and McClelland all started out as psychologists. 
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The first major critique concerns what level PDP models are intended to occupy. 
Broadbent argues that McClelland and Rumelhart (1985) inappropriately cast their 
distributed memory system as having “implications at the psychological and not merely 
at the physiological level” (Broadbent 1985). Broadbent’s appeal to levels refers to Marr 
(1982), with the implication that cognition ought to be independent of implementation. 
Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) pose Broadbent’s challenge as a dilemma: either 
connectionist models are “mere implementations” of symbolic models, or they fail to 
adequately capture cognition. If PDP models are psychological models, then neural 
details should be irrelevant and afford no advantage. If PDP models are implementation 
level models, they might be interesting to neuroscientists, but are not cognitive science. 
It would require many pages to list all the variations of this reaction. Suffice it to 
say that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has set it down as received opinion that 
there are two kinds of connectionist: implementational and radical. Implementational 
connectionists “hold that the brain’s net implements a symbolic processor,” while radical 
connectionists “claim that symbolic processing was a bad guess about how the mind 
works” (Garson 2015). Some connectionist projects, such as the articles in Hinton (1990), 
show that PDP models are capable of structured representations and serial processing, 
i.e., implementational connectionism. Other connectonist projects, such as Plaut (1995), 
show that what looks like serial processing on the surface, might be better explained in 
terms of network-level details, i.e., radical connectionism. A not-so-radical 
connectionism claiming that symbolic processing is a bad guess at how some mental 
functions work is closer to what most connectionists believe.  
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Either way, connectionists do not generally accept that their models are mere 
implementations. Rumelhart and McClelland (1985) object that much of what concerns 
cognitive psychologists is at the algorithmic rather than the computational level.5 
Smolensky (1988, 1988a) describes connectionist models as being at the “sub-symbolic 
level,” and says that the goal of connectionist research is a “middle ground between 
implementing symbolic computation and ignoring structure” (Smolensky 1988a). What 
this middle ground is exactly is unclear. 
2.2 The Neural Detail Problem 
Another well-rehearsed challenge is that connectionist models are unlike brains in 
their details. The backpropagation algorithm is infamous for being neurally implausible; 
error signals cannot in general be propagated backward through a network of neural 
connections, as the algorithm requires. Likewise, nodes in connectionist models typically 
have deterministic activation functions, whereas real action potentials are stochastic.  
A key example of the neural detail problem is the flexibility in how to interpret 
single units. In networks with local representations, units are assigned specific meanings, 
such as the names, occupations, and ages of members of the Jets and Sharks in 
McClelland (1981). In networks with distributed representations, “each entity is 
represented by a pattern of activity distributed over many computing elements, and each 
computing element is involved in representing many different entities” (Hinton 1984). 
Far too few units are used in most connectionist models to be realistic brain models. In 
some connectionist networks, units explicitly stand in for whole populations of neurons, 
                                                           
5 See Churchland and Sejnowski (1990) on how connectionist models relate to Marr’s 
levels. 
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with the activation of the unit representing a population vector.6 There is thus 
considerable diversity in what a unit is meant to correspond to. 
One of the most debated examples is the past-tense learner (Rumelhart and 
McClelland 1986). This network takes English verbs as inputs, and learns to output their 
past tenses. It is trained using a series of examples, including both regular verbs (add 
“ed”) and irregular verbs (went, swam). The past-tense learner’s success in learning to 
conjugate past tenses without any explicit set of rules separating regular and irregular 
verbs was, as Boden puts it, “theoretical dynamite” (Boden 2006, 956). However, the 
past-tense learner was also vigorously criticized for its failure to simulate physiological 
detail. The encoding of its input and output verbs, as phonetic triples called 
“Wickelfeatures” is perhaps the least plausible detail.  
Critics of connectionism treat these disanalogies as mistakes, but the PDP group 
was well aware that the “physiological” flavor stopped short of realistic detail. Volume 2, 
Chapter 20 of the PDP bible describes the ways in which artificial neural networks are 
not like real brains. The introduction also hedges on whether physiological plausibility is 
the goal:  
“Though the appeal of PDP models is definitely enhanced by their physiological 
plausibility and neural inspiration, these are not the primary bases for their appeal 
to us... PDP models appeal to us for psychological and computational reasons” 
(McClelland and Rumelhart 1986, 11).  
                                                           
6 Wilson and Cowan (1972) derived equations for the average spike rate of populations of 
neurons that allows populations of neurons with random, dense connections to be treated 
as aggregates, and these equations closely match those used in connectionist models. 
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Lack of realistic neural detail was, apparently, a design feature.  
Part of what is going on is that practical concerns require that models not be too 
complex. That putting too much detail into a model is a mistake is a common refrain 
among connectionists: “It’s not necessary to put in the kitchen sink to get insight... just to 
simulate the hell out of populations of everything in the model is mindless” (J.D. Cowan, 
quoted in Anderson and Rosenfeld 2000). McClelland (2009) argues that while there is a 
cost to making simplifications in modeling, it is necessary to simplify to achieve 
understanding. But the implausibility seems to run deeper than just pragmatism. 
2.3 The Abstraction Problem 
Another puzzle is that connectionists sometimes describe their models in 
mathematical terms. Smolensky claims that connectionism explores what continuous 
(rather than discrete) mathematics can reveal about the nature of cognition (1991). 
Thomas and McClelland call connectionist models, “a sub-class of statistical models 
involved in universal function approximation” (2008). 
An example of this is Touretzky and Hinton (1988), which shows how distributed 
representations can be used to “construct a working memory that requires far fewer units 
than the number of different facts that can potentially be stored” (Touretzky and Hinton 
1988). Here no effort is made to recreate neural details beyond general structural features. 
The point is to demonstrate a property such networks have no matter what the units 
represent, yet at the same time, the model is clearly meant as an investigation of working 
memory. One might wonder how it can do both. 
2.4 The Explanation Problem 
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The final challenge concerns the status of PDP models as explanations. Green 
worries that “if connectionist models are NOT to be considered THEORIES of cognition, 
in the traditional scientific sense of the word, then the question arises as to what exactly 
they are, and why we should pay attention to them” (Green 1998). According to Green, 
the only interpretation of connectionist networks as theories is one where they are “literal 
models of the brain activity that underpins cognition” (Green 1998). But this is 
undermined by the implausibility of connectionist models.  
In classical AI, a computer program that produces output comparable to human 
performance on a cognitive task is considered a theory of that cognitive task. In calling 
their programs theories, Newell and Simon (1961, 1976) have in mind the deductive-
nomological (DN) account (Hempel 1958): “[A] computer program used as a theory has 
the same epistemological status as a set of differential equations or difference equations 
used as a theory” (Newell and Simon 1961). The logical calculus in the program has the 
same status as the law and observation statements that constitute a theory in the physical 
sciences.  
Connectionist models are not theories in the DN sense; they do not logically 
deduce behavior or encode lawlike regularities. By the late 1980’s the DN account was 
no longer the received view of scientific explanation, but the lack of consensus on what 
should take its place left it open what sort of explanations connectionist models provide.  
3. Connectionist Models as Idealized Models of Cognitive Mechanisms 
Recent developments in philosophy of science shed light on the problems above.  
3.1  Mechanistic Explanation 
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The mechanistic view of explanation has largely supplanted the DN account in the 
biological sciences. The levels connectionists are concerned with can be thought of as 
mechanistic levels (Craver 2007). Mechanistic explanation situates a phenomenon within 
a multi-level system of mechanisms, where each level constrains and is constrained by its 
neighboring levels. A mechanistic explanation involves showing how component entities 
and their activities are organized to bring about a phenomenon, and identifying the 
mechanism’s role in higher-level phenomena. 
The suggestion that connectionist models can be understood in terms of 
mechanistic explanation is raised in Miłkowski (2013), and expanded upon in Stinson 
(2018). This insight is in tune with the PDP group’s stated motivations. Rather than 
seeing physiology and cognition as independent, connectionists explore the ways in 
which the physiological microstructure constrains cognition. The PDP bible lists the 
constraints they take from neuroscience, including: “There is a very large number of 
neurons… Neurons receive inputs from a large number of other neurons… Learning 
involves modifying connections… Neurons communicate by sending activation or 
inhibition through connections…” (Rumelhart and McClelland 1986b, 130–32).  
That mechanistic explanations have no privileged level helps explain why units 
can correspond to single neurons, populations of neurons, or higher-level entities like 
phonetic representations. Connectionist models can investigate any number of locations 
in a system of mechanisms. As Churchland puts it, ``Network models… depend in 
important ways on constraints from all levels of analysis…. Since the networks are meant 
to reflect principles at entirely different levels of organization, their implementations will 
also be at different scales in the nervous system” (Churchland and Sejnowski 1990). 
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3.2 Abstraction 
Simplicity is essential not only for getting models to work, but also for 
explanation. The cost of simplification is that when you draw an inference from a 
simplified model, it may be that the interesting properties of the model result from 
aspects of the model that differ from the target rather than from what the model and target 
have in common. Connectionist models are different from brains in many ways, so one 
might expect them to behave differently. This is an instance of a very general worry 
about scientific models, namely, which details need to be captured accurately for a model 
to inform us about the target system, and which can be safely altered. This problem has 
been the subject of much work in philosophy of science.  
One kind of simplification is what Cartwright (1989) calls abstraction. Abstract 
models remove details so that the effect of a small number of variables can more easily 
be investigated on their own. Abstracting away too many details can lead to error when 
there are complex relationships between variables, such that investigating each in 
isolation is not straightforwardly informative about the combined picture. Nevertheless, 
quite often it is perfectly legitimate. A comparison can be made to how experiments need 
to control variables in order to be interpretable. There is a trade-off to be made between 
naturalistic field experiments with many uncontrolled variables, and lab experiments that 
are more readily interpretable, but have less external validity.  
The trick is to figure out which details matter. Morgan (2002, 2003) argues for the 
importance of materiality: sharing the same materials lends experiments closer access to 
their targets than models, which makes experimental systems more likely to share the 
properties that are relevant. Parker objects to Morgan’s assessment of computer 
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simulations as “just mathematical modeling exercises” (Parker 2009), arguing that 
simulations are physical models. She points out that in weather forecasting, modelers are 
better able to set up the relevant initial conditions in a computer simulation than in a 
laboratory model that uses the same materials as real weather systems. Simulations are 
thus better able to predict the weather than “same stuff” laboratory models, and the key is 
“whether the experimental and target systems were actually similar in the ways that are 
relevant, given the particular question to be answered about the target system” (Parker 
2009, 493). In another meteorological model, sizable volumes of atmosphere are treated 
as homogeneous points in a grid, while measurements of the complex dynamics at a scale 
lower than the grid resolution are approximated with a single parameter value. Ignoring 
the known details at a finer grain of resolution leads to more accurate weather predictions 
than if those details were included in the model (Norton and Suppes 2001, 95–96). (See 
also Küppers and Lenhard 2004.) 
Likewise in cognitive modeling, when the goal is to predict the behaviour of a 
cognitive agent, pragmatic concerns like maximizing accuracy take precedence over 
modeling the finer details of the system. This can be seen in the popularity of support 
vector machines, which make little to no effort to mimic human visual processing, in the 
ImageNET image recognition challenge (Russakovsky et al. 2015).  
Giere (2004), and Godfrey-Smith (2006) focus on the representational role of 
models, and likewise argue that models and targets being similar in the relevant respects 
is what justifies inferences from the one to the other. Which similarities are relevant 
depends on the context: “scientists use continuous fluid models to represent water for the 
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purpose of studying fluid flow and also use molecular models for the purpose of 
representing water for the study of Brownian motion” (Giere 2004). 
If the point of the past-tense learner had been to model how verbs are represented 
in the brain, or to simulate conjugation in detail, then the manner of encoding input and 
output verbs would have been relevant, and using Wickelfeatures would have been 
inappropriate. But Rumelhart and McClelland wanted to see whether what appeared to be 
a structured rule-following behaviour could be achieved without building that structure 
in. The way the verbs are represented was bracketed off as irrelevant, given that goal.  
Winsberg highlights the importance of arguments, to demonstrate that the results 
scientists get “from manipulating their respective pieces of equipment are appropriately 
probative concerning the class of systems that interest them” (Winsberg 2009, 577). 
Those arguments are based not just on similarity, but also on having knowledge about 
how to build good models, which comes from past successes using the same bag of 
modeling tricks.  
Batterman (2001, 2002) describes how the use of mathematical tools like 
renormalization groups depends on paring down particular problems to minimal models. 
What Batterman calls “asymptotic” methods are able to explain the universal, stable 
phenomenologies that are shared by, for example, microstructurally diverse fluids near 
the critical point in phase transitions, as well as magnets transitioning between ferro- and 
paramagnetic states (Batterman 2001, 38). These methods not only offer explanations of 
these universal phenomena, but by “telling us what (and why) various details are 
irrelevant for the behavior of interest, this same analysis also identifies those physical 
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properties that are relevant for the universal behavior being investigated” (Batterman 
2001, 42).  
Something like asymptotic explanation appears in Fuhs and Touretzky’s (2006) 
model of path integration in spatial memory. Their model seeks to explain how rats 
navigating mazes are able to find efficient paths to goal locations regardless of the paths 
they have previously traveled, as well as the peculiar hexagonal patterns found in grid 
cells’ firing fields. As a possible explanation of the hexagonal patterns, Fuhs and 
Touretzky showed that “hexagonally spaced activity bumps can arise spontaneously on a 
sheet of neurons in a spin glass-type neural network model” (Fuhs and Touretzky 2006, 
4266). In spin glass models, each unit is connected to its closest neighbors in a multi-
dimensional grid. This network structure is loosely based on the local structure in 
entorhinal cortex, where grid cells are found, on the assumption that dendrites are closely 
packed. When circles or cylinders of uniform size are closely packed together, the highest 
density arrangement is a hexagonal pattern. This is true regardless of whether they are 
telecommunication cables, or dendrites running through nerve tracts. Fuhs and Touretzky 
(2006) justify arranging the units in their connectionist model of grid cells in a hexagonal 
pattern based on this fact about close packing, even though real dendrites are neither 
perfectly cylindrical nor uniform in size. Their explanation depends on not using a more 
accurate, detailed model, because without the assumption that the dendrites are uniform 
cylinders, the geometric fact about close packing could not have been applied.  
3.3 Idealization 
On Cartwright’s (1989) definition, idealization adds or changes details, such that 
the idealized model has properties not present in the target system. In lab experiments 
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idealizations might substitute more convenient materials, or assign implausible values to 
variables for ease of calculation. Backpropagation and deterministic activation functions 
are the clearest cases of idealization in connectionist modeling. At first blush, it seems 
like putting the wrong details in, as opposed to merely removing irrelevant details, should 
make for a worse model, but this is not generally the case.  
A number of authors have compared idealizations to fictions, and suggested that 
models are interpreted in much the same way as we interpret literature. Mäki’s (2012) 
analysis goes in a different direction. Mäki argues that apparently false idealizations can 
be interpreted as true in several distinct ways. Leaving out some factors can be intended 
as a “negligibility assumption,” i.e., that those factors have a negligible effect, given the 
intended purposes and audience of the model (Mäki 2012, 222). “Applicability 
assumptions” restrict the intended use of a model to domains where the factors left out 
have negligible effects (Mäki 2012, 225). Other kinds of assumptions might defend the 
use of an idealized model on the grounds that the idealization makes the model more 
tractable, or more suitable for pedagogical purposes (Mäki 2012, 228—230). These 
assumptions are not always spelled out explicitly. 
In some cases, the use of backpropagation in connectionist models could be 
justified with a tractability assumption, since it was for a time the only known method of 
updating weights that was guaranteed to converge. In other cases backpropagation can be 
justified with a negligibility assumption. For example, in NETtalk (Sejnowski and 
Rosenberg 1986) backpropagation is unproblematic given the purpose of the model, 
because their goal is to show that a system capable of pronouncing English words need 
not encode a complicated set of rules. For that purpose, it is fair to simply assume that the 
 16 
brain has some way of propagating error signals, without worrying about how exactly 
that happens. The particular pathways the error signals take don’t make a difference to 
what they’re investigating. In contrast, Suri and Schultz (2001) is a model of learning 
mechanisms, so the way error signals are propagated is highly relevant. In their model, 
backpropagation is not used; instead the anatomy of the basal ganglia is reproduced in 
some detail, including only pathways that exist in the brain and through which feedback 
is known to actually travel. 
The curious phrase “‘physiological’ flavor” might be interpreted to mean that 
connectionist models are idealized models of cognitive mechanisms. If you take away 
irrelevant details, and idealize others, cortex is an interconnected network of simple 
learning units. 
3.4 Discovery 
Models serve many different purposes in science, and many different strategies 
may be employed in the search for mechanisms. Anderson and Rosenfeld’s (2000) 
history of connectionism demonstrates that among connectionist modelers there have 
always been widely differing approaches in terms of how much physiological detail to 
include, and what the goals are. These goals include engineering, mathematical, 
psychological, and neuroscientific questions. Models intended for different epistemic 
roles require different characteristics. 
Steinle (1997, 2002) argues that experiments at different stages in a research 
project tend to have different epistemic goals, which means that different sorts of 
experiments are performed. For example, earlier exploratory experiments tend to try out 
many more combinations of parameter values in a search for potentially meaningful 
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correlations, while later “theory-driven” experiments use high precision equipment, and 
“are typically done with quite specific expectations of the various possible outcomes” 
(Steinle 1997).  
Steinle’s analysis also holds for models. Models used at different stages in a 
research project tend to have different epistemic goals, and correspondingly may vary in 
terms of how idealized or specific they should be in order to meet those goals. This 
difference in epistemic goals is reflected in the difference in detail in the learning 
mechanisms used in NETtalk compared to models of the basal ganglia.  
4 Epistemology and Metaphysics of Models  
This section continues in the spirit of Irvine (2014), where considering 
computational modeling practices from cognitive neuroscience problematized and revised 
claims from the models and simulations literature. Other examples of work on 
computational modeling in the neurocognitive sciences are Kaplan (2011), which argues 
that computational explanations in neuroscience are mechanistic explanations; 
Chirimuuta (2018), which argues that there are “numerous instances of mathematical, 
non-causal explanation” in computational neuroscience; and Stinson (2018), where I 
argue that connectionist cognitive models explain using a logic of tendencies in contrast 
to classical AI’s use of inference to the best explanation.  
What these examples share is a concern with questions about causation and 
ontology, quite unlike the focus on representations characteristic of the models and 
simulations literature (see Suárez 2003; Giere 2004; Weisberg 2012; Frigg and Nguyen 
2016). Perhaps the reason is that cognitive scientists have learned to regard with some 
suspicion appeals to representations as explanations, and tend to worry about how 
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putative representations acquire and transmit their contents. This more critical take on 
representation, and causal-mechanistic bent could be helpfully applied to the models and 
simulations literature.  
Three open questions in that literature are how relevant similarity ought to be 
judged, how inferences from models to targets are justified, and what the metaphysical 
status of models is. On the first two questions, the state of the art seems to be that which 
similarities are relevant has to be decided on a case-by-case basis (Parker 2009), and that 
we have to provide arguments to justify our modeling choices (Winsberg 2009). A deeper 
analysis of the criteria modelers use in making these judgments is needed.  
Godfrey-Smith (2009) lays out the problem of the metaphysical status of models. 
He notes that model systems are “in a sense, of the same kind as the target systems that 
the models are used to help us understand” (Godfrey-Smith 2009), but rejects what 
scientists say about planets, populations, or economies being “inside the computer” even 
in a loose sense. He resists attributing computational models object-hood such that 
they’re taken as “shadowy additional graspable thing[s],” and endorses the comment 
attributed to Deena Weisberg that the Platonism of mathematicians is a “folk ontology” 
(Godfrey-Smith 2009). Godfrey-Smith describes the Platonist view as taking the model to 
be an abstract entity that can be investigated mathematically, then requiring a mapping of 
abstract properties to the physical properties of the target.  
The Platonist view is implicitly rejected because it runs into the Third Man 
problem, by assuming the independent reality of abstract objects. But, if models are not 
objects that can be directly compared to targets, the question remains how they can 
inform us about concrete things. Representations and fictions are overly flexible; 
 19 
anything can happen in fiction, so it does not adequately constrain inferences to real 
world targets. As Frigg and Nguyen argue, “One can imagine almost anything about 
almost any object, but unless there are criteria telling us which of these imaginings 
should be regarded as true of the target, these imaginings don’t licence any surrogative 
reasoning” (2016). The metaphysical problem and the inference problem are thus in 
tension with one another. 
Winsberg (2010) likewise notes that “Practitioners of simulation” favor the idea 
that simulations literally mimic their target systems, such that a simulation of fluid 
dynamics can be viewed as an experiment in a “virtual wind tunnel” (Winsberg 2010, 
35). But Winsberg raises the problem of “whether or not, to what extent, and under what 
conditions a simulation reliably mimics the physical system of interest” (Winsberg 2010, 
37).  
A common assumption in representational accounts of models is that the relation 
between model and world is one of similarity, following Giere’s (1988) diagram, 
reproduced here in figure 1. Winsberg notes that the relation between models and targets 
has to be something “far more complicated than mimicry” (Winsberg 2010, 39). What 
this more complicated relation might be is key to all three questions at hand.  
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Figure 1. Relations between theory, model and reality, reproduced from Giere (1988, 83).  
Frigg and Nguyen offer a more complicated candidate relation in their DEKI 
account. According to DEKI, models are interpreted as exemplifying a set of properties 
of interest, which are mapped to properties imputed to the target. The addition of more 
stations along the way between model and target solves a number of problems with direct 
representation accounts (see Frigg and Nguyen 2016), but retains the main weakness of 
representational accounts, since a mapping between sets of properties does little to ensure 
that one reliably mimics the other. 
4.1 An Alternative to Representational Accounts of Models 
My analysis of inference in connectionist modeling from Stinson (2018) can be 
extended into an alternative account of models. This account provides a more robust 
connection between properties of models and targets, and legitimizes scientists’ views 
about the ontology of models. I argue that inferences are drawn from connectionist 
models to their targets indirectly via kinds that both the model and target exemplify. A 
diagram illustrating this set of relations is given in figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Relations between model, target and kind. 
On this account, the inferences modelers draw from models to targets have the following 
structure:  
P1  The target system T is an instance of kind K.  
P2  Model M is an instance of K.  
C  Therefore T should be similar to M.  
In the case of connectionist models, T is the brain or cognitive system being investigated, 
and M is the connectionist model.  
This extra step of associating the model first with a kind then that kind with the 
target is promising for several reasons. One is that it makes better sense of idealization 
than representational accounts of modeling do. A good model is often very minimal, 
including only the properties of interest, and few other details. If similarity were the 
criterion for model target relations, more details would be better, not fewer. But if 
capturing the characteristic properties of a kind is the goal, then idealized models are 
exactly what one ought to aim for. Similarity is what we want to infer as a conclusion, 
not what we aim for in model building.  
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Second is that it can provide needed guidance about which similarities are the 
relevant ones to capture in a model. The properties that a model should mimic from the 
target are the ones that are characteristic of the kind they both belong to. As long as we 
have a way of picking out kinds, this gives specific guidance about what the relevant 
similarities are: something representational accounts were unable to do.  
The account also has other nice properties. It fits well with Godfrey-Smith’s 
observation that models sometimes describe one case of a target phenomenon, then act as 
a hub, anchoring all the “actual-world” cases (Godfrey-Smith 2009). The hub is the kind 
captured by the model. Models with no target are likewise accounted for by treating the 
kind as a generalized target. 
What is still wanting in this account is a way of delineating kinds, telling which 
kinds a target belongs to, and a workaround to the problem of universals. One missing 
piece can be provided by Khalidi’s (1998, 2013) broad view of kinds. Khalidi argues that 
scientific kinds like parasite, liquid, or schizophrenia should be considered “real kinds”7 
because “we discovered things about them which were by no means implied when they 
were first introduced” (Khalidi 1998). This account of kinds assumes neither essential 
natures, nor strictly hierarchical relationships between kinds. As such, it is promiscuous 
enough to accommodate most any phenomena that one might want to model. But because 
members of kinds have non-arbitrary things in common, kinds provide a basis for 
inferring that members likely have the properties characteristic of the kind in common 
with each other.  
                                                           
7 Khalidi (2013) uses the term “natural kinds”, but in conversation says that he wished he 
had called them “real kinds”. 
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Khalidi’s kinds might be made more robust by connecting them to Andersen’s 
(2017) information-theoretic update to Dennett’s (1991) “real patterns”. A real pattern is 
one that “can be reliably picked out and tracked through time and which allows one to 
make predictions that are better than chance” (Andersen 2017). A collection of 
phenomena that manifest a real pattern according to Andersen would count as the 
members of a real kind according to Khalidi.  
Andersen comments on the “profligacy” of patterns, saying that “there could be a 
vast number of different ways of picking out such patterns that give us predictive grasp 
on the system” (Andersen 2017), but just as the promiscuity of Khalidi’s kinds should not 
be troubling given that they don’t assume anything about essences or hierarchies of kinds, 
the profligacy of Andersen’s patterns should not be troubling because “the degree of 
realism is very, very minimal” (Andersen 2017). Both Khalidi and Andersen argue that 
the concern that this allows for too many kinds or patterns is overblown. The criteria that 
kinds or patterns can be reliably picked out, tracked, and make useful predictions are not 
met by jerry-rigged kinds.  
Against the worry that patterns are epiphenomenal, Andersen claims “The 
overwhelming majority of patterns are counterfactually robust, in that they could have 
differed in their microphysical details in each token instantiation without thereby altering 
the relatum’s causal profile” (2017). That idealized and simplified models of causal 
processes are often most useful for figuring out how those processes work would be 
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mysterious were it not the case that these patterns are real in some sense that goes beyond 
the reality of their microphysical details.8  
Both Khalidi and Andersen claim at least a minimal reality for their kinds / 
patterns. On Andersen’s account, patterns are part of the causal nexus, and “higher-level 
causes are just as real as lower-level causes” (Andersen 2017). Her deke around the 
problem of universals is that what is real is “the causal nexus and patterns instantiated in 
it, which are informationally structured, but where the information itself is a structure of 
something else, not a reified extra substance” (Andersen 2017).  
One can go a step further in endorsing the folk ontology of scientists, and 
interpret these reality claims as implicating additional shadowy things of a sort. But 
before the kneejerk reaction that this runs into the problem of universals kicks in, let’s 
look at some recent developments in metaphysics, where respectable options are 
available for considering universals as concrete in some sense.  
Hennig (2014) offers a possible solution to the problem of universals, based on 
Baxter (2001), wherein kinds have concrete aspects, making them in a sense “the same 
as” instances of the kind. Hennig summarizes the account in the following way: “that 
Socrates instantiates the kind seated thing means that there is an aspect of Socrates that is 
also an aspect of the kind seated thing. This aspect can be described in two ways: (1) as 
Socrates qua seated thing or (2) as seated thing qua instantiated by Socrates” (Hennig, 
2014). Hennig clarifies as follows:  
                                                           
8 Both Khalidi and Andersen reject the suggestion that Kim’s causal exclusion argument 
might cause problems for the reality of promiscuous/profligate kinds or patterns.  
 25 
That Socrates instantiates the kind “seated thing” means that there is a 
seated thing that is the same as Socrates. This thing is one of his aspects. 
Socrates is an instance of seated thing, and seated thing is an aspect of 
Socrates. The aspect is not a third entity mediating between Socrates and 
the universal “being seated”; there are only two things: Socrates and the 
aspect. (Hennig, personal communication) 
Aspects, unlike Platonic universals, are concrete and in the world. The aspect ‘Socrates 
qua human’ has flesh and bones.  
This brief detour into contemporary metaphysics shows that there are respectable 
options available that allow us to take seriously the views of scientists about the reality of 
models. Putting these pieces together, the relation between kind and target can be 
understood as the relation between aspect and instance, and the relation of model to target 
as between two instances of the same aspect. It is tempting to think of models as though 
there are two of them, the ideal one and the instantiated one. The ideal one is what 
scientists think is really in the target system, and really in the computer. The instantiated 
model is the tool we use to get at the ideal. The former is the aspect. The latter is an 
instance.  
The practice of modeling picks out an aspect of the target to investigate, then 
constructs an instance of that aspect that can be manipulated conveniently. A 
mathematical model like the Hodkin-Huxley equation comes pretty close to being the 
aspect under investigation, while models that substitute another material for the material 
in the target (like architectural models, model organisms, and analog models), are 
instances that have additional aspects not characteristic of the kind in question.  
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I am seated right now as I write, making me an instance of ‘seated thing’. In 
virtue of being seated, I could act as a model of ‘Socrates qua seated thing’. Based on this 
model, I could speculate that Socrates’s toes might also have been prone to falling asleep 
after sitting too long on a hard chair. But I also have other aspects that are not shared with 
Socrates. It would not be wise to conclude that Socrates too would usually be drinking 
tea, and overhearing conversations in English while sitting on a hard chair. The instances 
of ‘seated thing’ near me do share some of those aspects, but they share them in virtue of 
being instances of ‘person working at Propeller Coffee’. A better model of ‘seated thing’ 
would be isolated from noises and hot beverages. 
 The status of computational models is a bit subtler. In some ways they are like 
mathematical models in that they are close to being pure aspects. But as Parker argues, 
computational models are also physical models with properties of their own (like being 
made with transistors). Within a range of conditions those other aspects can be made 
irrelevant, but in the presence of large magnets or when submerged in water, 
computational models will show their colours as electronic devices. A computational 
model qua made with transistors may not be informative about cognition, but a 
computational model qua connectionist network ought to be.  
What makes computers so useful in modeling is that they are designed to have the 
capacity to explore the aspect of your choice, while isolating that aspect from their other 
aspects (made with transistors, notebook sized, manufactured in China, etc.). If you 
consider only particular output streams, like images, printouts, or certain files (as 
opposed to measuring the CPU’s temperature, or seeing what happens when you whack it 
with a hammer), and assume a translation code that interprets that output, a programmer 
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can make a computer be an instance of a wide variety of aspects. Other kinds of models, 
like fruit flies in genetics, are likewise chosen because they make the investigation of a 
given aspect more feasible (faster, cheaper, more ethical) than it would be to investigate 
that aspect in the target itself. For a model to be minimally appropriate it has to be an 
instance of the aspect of interest. That the model and target are the same in the sense of 
sharing an aspect is what sanctions inferences from one to the other. 
The starting point in building a model is identifying a kind K that the system of 
interest belongs to, and which the model will be designed to investigate. One factor that 
affects the strength of the inference is whether K is a real, robust kind capable of 
sustaining generalizations. For the most generic Ks in connectionist modeling, the choice 
of model amounts to the wager that some of the generalizations that are relevant to 
cognition operate at the network level. Another factor is whether M is a representative 
instance of K. Models with a minimum of properties that are not typical of Ks are more 
representative. Finally, the inference depends on T also being of kind K. If K is a real 
kind, and M is a minimal instance of K, whatever one finds out about the kind K by 
investigating M should, all else being equal, also be true of T, assuming T belongs to K. 
It may still happen that T is atypical in relevant respects, so fails to have the same 
properties as M despite belonging to the same kind K.  
 Considering models in the neurocognitive sciences has motivated the need for a 
more complex account of the model-target relation, better answers to questions about 
relevant similarity, and more detail about the metaphysics of models. The bare outlines of 
a novel epistemology and metaphysics of models has been drawn here from an analysis 
of inference in connectionist modeling.  
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5 Inferences via Kinds in Computational Cognitive Science 
Let’s see how this account works in practice, by applying it to some examples. In 
Marr’s (1969) theory of the cerebellum, the starting points are some basic anatomical 
knowledge about the types of cells found in the cerebellum and the patterns and numbers 
of connections between them; the hypothesis that the function of the cerebellum is to 
learn motor skills; and ideas about feature analysis then current in the AI literature (Marr 
1969, 469). He suggests that “the mossy fibre-granule cell-Purkinje cell arrangement 
could operate as a pattern recognition device” where the “mossy fibre-granule cell 
articulation is essentially a pattern separator” (Marr 1969, 440). Marr then proceeds to 
mathematically derive constraints on codon size and other measures.  
In this case, Marr abstracts from the functional anatomy of the cerebellum to a 
generic kind K defined by the numbers and types of connections between cell types, with 
constraints determining loose boundaries. Mathematical derivations uncover the 
properties of K, and these properties are applied as a hypothesis about the target system, 
the cerebellum. 
In another early treatment of distributed representation, Hinton (1984) describes 
how sparsely encoded, distributed representations can give rise to properties such as 
efficient data storage, content-addressable memory, and automatic generalization. These 
properties are established through both formal derivations, and simple connectionist 
models. Hinton argues that whenever “abstract models are implemented in the brain 
using distributed representations” we can take these properties to be “primitive 
operations” (Hinton 1984, 3).  
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In this case, K is distributed representations, and M instantiates K in a simple 
network that learns associations between word form and meaning. Here M is chosen to be 
an instance where the properties of interest should be difficult to achieve: “This is a case 
in which distributed representations appear to be much less suitable than local ones, 
because the associations are purely arbitrary” (Hinton 1984, 3). The properties of interest 
are nevertheless confirmed in M, and the conclusion is drawn that these are properties of 
K in general. In this case, Hinton’s strategy is to choose a model that seems unlikely to 
have the property of interest, as a way of demonstrating that the property generalizes 
across kind members. 
These properties of distributed representations have also been confirmed in more 
detailed models of cortical systems. For example, Babadi and Sompolinsky (2014) 
analyze the computational benefits of sparseness (few neurons respond to any given 
stimulus) and expansion (increased dimensionality in the cortical layer) in “generic 
ensembles of clustered stimuli,” focusing on “relatively simple and biologically plausible 
architectures and dynamics” (Babadi and Sompolinsky 2014, 1213). They draw 
implications for olfactory and visual processing, as well as the mossy fibers of the 
cerebellum. Billings et al. (2014) investigate sparse encoding in the cerebellum using 
“biologically detailed network models of spiking neurons, whose parameters were 
constrained by experimental measurements” in order to determine the contribution that 
synaptic connectivity makes to effective pattern separation.  
These cases define increasingly specific Ks to which cerebellar networks belong. 
The models in these examples confirm the general properties of the more generic kinds 
explored in earlier papers, and establish a more nuanced picture of the properties of the 
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more specific kinds, as well as investigating the boundary cases where the typical 
properties of the kind break down. As the models get more detailed and realistic, the 
inferences from model to target are strengthened, because the model and target share 
more properties, but the scope of the conclusions decreases as the kind becomes more 
specific. Babadi and Sompolinsky’s conclusions also apply to olfactory and visual cortex, 
while Billings et al.’s conclusions are specific to cerebellum. 
There is a continuum here between making more generic theoretical models and 
more specific models of particular brain areas. Models may be located anywhere between 
these extremes, with tradeoffs between inference strength and generalizability. 
6. Conclusion 
There is much to be gained from reconnecting philosophy of AI to philosophy of 
science. Their estrangement has left a vacuum where methodological critiques of AI 
ought to be. It would be hard to overstate the urgency with which that kind of work is 
needed. Likewise, if philosophy of science is to provide credible support against attacks 
on climate models, accounts of computational models need to go deeper than fiction. 
Beyond these life or death motivations, there is also philosophical and scientific value in 
embracing AI within philosophy of science. 
On the part of AI, we gain an answer to the question of why building some of the 
constraints that hold of the neural hardware into connectionist models makes them better 
able to capture cognition, even without any attempt at realistic detail. Insights from 
philosophy of science help establish that connectionist models can be understood as 
idealized, multi-level models of the mechanisms underlying cognition. This allows their 
strengths and weaknesses to be evaluated. 
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On the part of philosophy of science, a close look at computational models in 
cognitive science lays the groundwork for a novel epistemology and metaphysics of 
models, which helps illuminate outstanding problems in the models and simulations 
literature. Indirectly mediating between models and targets via kinds allows for more 
specific answers to questions about how to choose relevant similarities in model building, 
how we justify inferences from models to targets, and the metaphysical nature of models. 
Artificial neural networks tell us about real cognitive systems by demonstrating the 
properties of the kinds they both belong to, or the aspects they have in common. This 
analysis may also prove helpful in understanding other types of models, including model 
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